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Abstract
A cosmological model is proposed which uses a causality argument
to solve the homogeneity and entropy problems of cosmology. In
this model a chronology violating region of spacetime causally pre-
cedes the remainder of the Universe, and a theorem establishes the
existence of time functions precisely outside the chronology vio-
lating region. This model is shown to nicely reproduce Augustine
of Hippo’s thought on time and the beginning of the Universe.
In the model the spacelike boundary representing the Big Bang
is replaced by a null hypersurface at which the gravitational de-
grees of freedom are almost frozen while the matter and radiation
content is highly homogeneous and thermalized.
1 Introduction
In this work I shall present a cosmological model allowed by general rela-
tivity which can be regarded as a mathematical representation of previous
ideas by Augustine of Hippo (354 - 430) on time and the creation of the
Universe. This model provides also some novel and natural solutions to
the homogeneity and entropy problems of cosmology.
Instead of introducing the model directly, in order to clarify the cor-
respondence with Augustine’s thought, we shall first investigate whether
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and how to include a notion of God in theoretical physics. Taking into
account that physics is expressed in the mathematical language we shall
seek a mathematical object that could represent at least some aspects of
what in common language we call God.
Of course, whatever definition of God is given it cannot be able to
cover all the ideas that circulate concerning the nature of God. For this
essay I shall start from a quite restrictive portion of Augustine philosophy
in which statements are made that may allow us to identify a cosmological
notion of God.
In order to avoid misunderstandings I stress that this paper is not
concerned about the problem of the existence of God, nor does it make
claims in this respect. Its main goal is to introduce some causality argu-
ments that may prove important in cosmology, and to stress the amus-
ing similarities with previous ideas by Augustine. Of course in order to
make sense of those, one has to assume, for the sake of the argument,
the existence of God, for otherwise it would be impossible to follow Au-
gustine’s philosophical thought on the origin of time and the beginning
of the Universe. In particular, in this work we wish to clarify and em-
phasize Augustine’s amazing ability to distinguish between temporality
and causality, something that will find a mathematical expression only
with the advent of the general theory of relativity.
The reader interested on how modern cosmology has influenced philoso-
phers’ arguments for God’s existence may consult Craig and Smith’s book
[6] or the papers [30, 2]. Craig’s [5] and Ganssle’s [8] monographs give
also a good account of time theories and how they relate to the idea of
God, in particular they treat the question of whether God should con-
sistently be thought as a temporal or timelessness entity, a question that
we shall also meet in what follows. Nevertheless, the reader should keep
in mind that those arguments may need to be modified if the picture of
the beginning of the Universe proposed in these pages turns out to be
correct, as the spacelike Big Bang hypersurface would be replaced by a
null hypersurface that continues in a chronology violating region.
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2 Augustine’s conclusions on the nature of
God
To begin we need to explore some ideas concerning the nature of God.
Here I shall consider some conclusions reached by the philosopher Au-
gustine that are largely independent of the sacred texts and which are
shared by different religions. They are:
1. There is an entity which we call God that satisfies the following
points.
2. God has created the world.
3. God cannot be wrong.
Our analysis will involve only these assumptions on the God side, while
for those on the scientific side we shall take from our present knowledge
of physics.
At the time of Augustine the Manichæans asked the following ques-
tion ”What was God doing before creating the world?”. Any answer to
the question seems to involve a paradox. If God created the world at one
time and not at a previous time then God changed his mind concerning
the possibility of creating the world, thus he was wrong in not creating it
in the first place. The only conclusion is that God cannot have created
the world, because whatever decision God takes he has already taken it.
This is a clear conflict with point 2 that states that God has created the
world, and thus that the world has not always existed. The conclusion of
the argument is in fact more general: the will of God is eternal as there
cannot be discontinuities in it, and so should be all the creations that
follow from that will.
Augustine’s famous reply can be found in the XI book of the Con-
fessions [31, 29]. This book contains one of the most fortunate studies
of the concept of time especially in the chapters starting from 14 where
one can find the famous sentence “What, then, is time? If no one ask
me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not.” The reply
that interests us is contained in chapters 10-13 where he considers some
issues relating time, creation and God.
First he states that he will not reply (Chap. 12, Par. 14)
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“like the man that, they say, answered avoiding with a joke
the pressure of the question: ‘God was preparing the hell
for those who pry into such deep mysteries’. A thing is to
understand, and another thing is to jeer. I will not answer
this way. I would more likely answer: ‘I know not what I
know not’ [ ].”
Augustine goes on clarifying that with world one must understand
all the creations of God. He accepts the conclusion that the will of
God is eternal, but denies that from that it follows the eternity of the
world. According to Augustine all the times are created by God itself
so that God comes “before” every time although this “before” must be
understood in a causal but not in a temporal way. In fact Augustine
writes (Chap. 13, Par. 16)
“It is not in time that you precedes the times. Otherwise
you would not precede them all. [ ] You are always the same,
your years never end. Your years neither come nor go; ours
instead come and go, for all of them will come. Yours are
all together because they are stable; they don’t go because of
those coming, as they do not pass. Instead these, ours, will
be when all shall cease to be. Your years are one day, and
your day is not daily, but today; because your today yields no
tomorrow, nor it follows yesterday. Your day is the eternity
[ ]. You created all the times and before the times you were,
and without a time there wouldn’t be any time”.
Note that Augustine deduces, as the Manichæans did, that the will
of God cannot change, but he does not find in that any contradiction.
For him, God does not perceive time as we do; not only is God’s will
in a kind of permanent state but it is its very perception of time which
shares this same permanence, this same eternal state.
I regard Augustine reply to the Manichæan question as logical given
the premises. Of course although I claim that Augustine reply is logical
I do not claim that with these considerations we are making science.
Indeed, the main difficulty relies in the quite unclear subjects and verbs
entering points 1, 2 and 3. However, this problem cannot be avoided
from the start. The purpose of this work is to convert in a more rigorous
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language the earlier sentences. For the moment let me summarize what
Augustine deduced from 1, 2 and 3 in the following additional points.
4. The will of God is eternal.
5. God created all the times, in particular God precedes all the times
in a causal way. Nevertheless, God does not precede the times in
a temporal way as the times did not exist before their creation.
6. Although God is not in our time, there is a kind of God’s perception
of time radically different from that of humans. For God time is
still, eternal, it is not perceived as a flow.
It is somewhat puzzling that Augustine used repeatedly the word ‘times’
in the plural form. Perhaps this is due to the fact that, although we often
regard the Newtonian absolute time as the most intuitive and widespread
notion of time, it wasn’t so for Augustine. Another reason could be
related with the concept of psychological and hence subjective time that
Augustine had certainly elaborated (“Is in you, my mind, that I measure
time” Chap. 28, Par. 36). We shall return on the relevance of this maybe
accidental plurality later.
3 The chronology protection conjecture
Starting from assumptions 1, 2 and 3 we have been able to derive further
facts on God’s nature given by points 4, 5 and 6. Despite their somewhat
vague formulations these conclusions will prove quite stringent. Indeed,
as we shall see, points 3, 4 and 6 will suggest the mathematical object
through which we could represent Augustine’s cosmological God, while
points 1, 2 and 5 will allow us to put further constraints on a Universe
admitting a God. In particular these constraints will offer new solutions
to some old cosmological problems.
We now need to assume some familiarity of the reader with general
relativity. In short the spacetime (M, g), is a time oriented 4-dimensional
manifold endowed with a Lorentzian metric of signature (−,+,+,+).
The points of M are called events. A non-vanishing tangent vector v ∈
TMp can be spacelike, lightlike or timelike depending on the value of
g(v, v) respectively, positive, zero or negative. The lightlike directions
give the direction of propagation of light. The terminology extends to
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curves γ : I → M , provided the causal characterization of the tangent
vector is consistent throughout the curve. If there is a timelike curve
connecting two events p and q we write p≪ q or q ∈ I+(p) or (p, q) ∈ I+,
where I+ is the chronology relation. If two events are connected by a
causal curve or they are the same we write p ≤ q or q ∈ J+(p) or
(p, q) ∈ J+, where J+ is the causal relation.
It is widely held that any reasonable spacetime should satisfy, along
with Einstein’s equations, some additional causality requirement [13].
One of the weakest requirements that can be imposed on spacetime is
that of chronology: there are no closed timelike curves (sometimes called
CTC).
The fundamental problem of justifying chronology has received less
attention than deserved. It is quite easy to construct solutions of the Ein-
stein equations that violate chronology, consider for instance Minkowski
spacetime with the slices t = 0 and t = 1 identified, or think of Go¨del or
Kerr’s spacetimes. Thus the problem is not if spacetime solutions of the
Einstein equations can admit CTCs but rather if reasonable spacetimes
not presenting CTCs may develop them.
S. Hawking argued that the laws of physics will always prevent a
spacetime to form closed timelike curves, in fact he raised this expectation
to the status of conjecture, now called chronology protection conjecture
[32]. According to it the effects preventing the formation of CTCs may
also be quantistic in nature, in fact Hawking claims that the divergence
of the stress energy tensor at the chronology horizon (i.e. the boundary of
the chronology violating set, the latter being the region over which CTCs
pass) would be the principal candidate for a mechanism preventing the
formation of CTCs.
Despite some work aimed at proving the chronology protection conjec-
ture its present status remains quite unclear with some papers supporting
it and other papers suggesting its failure [33, 34, 18, 19, 15]. Some peo-
ple think that in order to solve the problem of the chronology protection
conjecture a full theory of quantum gravity would be required [12, 11].
Apart from the technical motivations, the principal reason behind the
rejection of spacetimes presenting chronology violations remains mostly
a philosophical one. A closed timelike curve represents an observer which
is forced to live an infinite number of times the same history (the grand-
father paradox).
It is simply unacceptable that a human being, or any other entity
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presenting some form of free will, be stuck into a cycle in which always
the same decisions are taken. Whatever a closed timelike curve might
represent there seems to be consensus that it cannot represent the concept
of “observer” to which we are used in physics.
Nevertheless, whereas the usual notion of “observer” cannot be rep-
resented by a CTC worldline, Augustine’s cosmological God may indeed
be represented by such worldline. Indeed, we have seen that according to
middle-age philosophy God has an eternal will (point 4) thus faced with
the same conditions he would pass through the same decisions. It can-
not change direction because he confirms the correctness of the previous
decision each time he is facing it.
It is curious that despite the fact that general relativity does not
model the concept of free will, the presence of CTC, by producing an
obstacle to this notion, provides a contact to philosophical considerations
that otherwise would be unrelated with this theory.
Now, we have to expand some more on the consideration that Au-
gustine’s cosmological God may be modeled by a CTC. First recall that
the chronology violating set C is made of all the points p ∈M such that
p≪ p. This set splits into equivalence classes [p] by means of the equiv-
alence relation p ∼ q if p≪ q ≪ p. In other words p and q belong to the
same equivalence class if there is a closed timelike curve passing through
both p and q. Moreover, in this case the timelike curve is entirely con-
tained in [p]. It is possible to prove that the sets [p] are all open in the
manifold topology.
If p and q belong to the same chronology violating class then they
have the same chronological role, in fact as p ≪ q and q ≪ p it is not
possible to say which one comes before. They are in a sense ‘simultane-
ous’. Indeed, p can be connected to q also by a lightlike causal curve and
the same holds in the other direction, thus it is indeed possible to move
from p to q and then from q to p in zero proper time. In particular any
timelike curve passing through [p] would not cross events that follow ‘one
after the other’ but rather almost equivalent events, actually chronologi-
cally undistinguishable. This picture fits well with point 6, that is, with
Augustine conclusion that “Your years are one day, and your day is not
daily, but today; because your today yields no tomorrow, nor it follows
yesterday. Your day is the eternity [ ].” All that suggests to regard God
not as a single CTC, in fact given one, one would get an infinite number
of them in the same chronology violating class, but rather as a chronol-
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ogy violating class [p] itself. This class [p] has also to satisfy point 1,
which we convert into the mathematical statement M = I+([p]), namely
any point of M is chronologically preceded by a point of God.
Thus we are led to the following definition
Definition 3.1. On a spacetime (M, g), we call God a chronology vio-
lating class [p] such that M = I+([p]).
I will write this concept in italics in order to distinguish this technical
notion from Augustine’s notion of cosmological God that we met in the
previous sections and that inspired it.
Note that given a God, then any point of God generates M in the
sense that p ∈ God ⇒ I+(p) = M , and thus generates itself p ≪ p. In
suggestive terms, any portion of God creates itself and the whole world.
Provided God exists it is unique, as the following theorem proves
Theorem 3.2. There is at most one chronology violating class [p] such
that M = I+([p]).
Proof. Indeed, M = I+([q]) = I+([p]) implies q ∈ M = I+([p]) = I+(p),
and with the roles of p and q interchanged we get p ∈ I+(q), thus p ∼ q
and hence [p] = [q]. 
Since to any chronology violating class [r] not satisfying M = I+([r])
we can still apply the arguments relating it to points 4 and 6, we give
the following definition
Definition 3.3. We call minor God a chronology violating class which
is not a God.
Now, the chronology protection conjecture in its original formula-
tion may be rephrased as follows “there are no minor Gods”, in fact the
chronology protection conjecture, roughly speaking, states that chronol-
ogy violating regions cannot form but does not state that they cannot
exist since the beginning of the Universe. I must say, however, that
any mechanism accomplishing the chronology protection would proba-
bly exclude, once applied to the backward direction, also any chronology
violating region. Probably the issue as to whether there could be a mech-
anism that removes minor Gods while keeping a God could be answered
only by showing the details of the chronology protection mechanism.
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Let us assume for simplicity that there are no minor Gods and let
us show in which way the definition of God satisfies point 5. Recall
that a time function is a continuous function t : M → R such that
x < y ⇒ t(x) < t(y), namely a function that increases over every causal
curve. For instance any observer in Minkowski spacetime has its own
time function.
Clearly, no time function can exist in the presence of a CTC, because
if p ≪ q ≪ p then t(p) < t(q) < t(p), which is impossible. Indeed, the
presence of a time function is equivalent to stable causality (i.e. causality
is stable under sufficiently small perturbations of the metric) which is
a much stronger causality property than chronology. Given one time
function one has that a multitude of time functions exist.
Nevertheless, although M does not admit a time function, the space-
time M\C¯ with the induced metric may indeed admit a time function
and hence many of them. In other words, the part of spacetime not
containing God (or better its closure) may admit time functions. In this
sense God precedes the region of the Universe were time makes sense,
but in a causal rather that a temporal way as those time functions are
not defined in the region of God. This is exactly Augustine’s conclusion
summarized by point 5.
The nice fact is that not only M\C¯ may admit a time function, but
that it must admit a time function, provided null geodesic completeness
and other reasonable physical conditions are satisfied. For more details
on these conditions see [25, 13].
Theorem 3.4. Let (M, g) be a spacetime which admits no chronology
violating class but possibly for the one, denoted [r], which generates the
whole universe, i.e. I+([r]) = M . Assume that the spacetime satisfies
the null convergence condition and the null genericity condition on the
lightlike inextendible geodesics which are entirely contained in M\[r], and
suppose that these lightlike geodesics are complete. Then the spacetime
M\[r] is stably causal and hence admits a time function.
(For the proof see the appendix.)
The fact that the assumption of null geodesic completeness may be
actually compatible with the singularity theorems is discussed in [25].
In conclusions we have given a definition of God that satisfies some
technical properties which represent pretty well points 2-6.
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The figure 1 summarizes the picture of a spacetime admitting a God.
There are in fact solutions of the Einstein equations admitting a similar
causal structure. The most important is the Taub-NUT metric, which
so far has not been considered as a serious candidate for a cosmological
solution. Here I would like to suggest that if not the metric structure,
at least the causal structure of the Taub-NUT solution could indeed be
similar to that of our Universe. In fact sometimes causal structures like
Taub-NUT are dismissed on the ground that they have no ‘Big Bag’, no
initial singularity, a fact which would contradict Hawking’s singularity
theorem and observations.
This conclusion is incorrect: Hawking’s (1967) singularity theorem
states that, given an expanding cosmological flow and some other condi-
tions, there should be some past incomplete timelike geodesic. However,
this timelike geodesic may well be totally imprisoned in a compact set.
In this case it may spiral towards the boundary of the chronology vio-
lating set without reaching it. In this picture the ‘Big Bang’ is replaced
by the boundary of the chronology violating region, exactly that slice
that separates God from the rest of the Universe. Finally, its hot nature
seems to fit well with the said divergence of the stress energy tensor that
is expected according to the chronology protection conjecture. In fact
there is also the possibility that the matching between the chronology
violating set and the rest of the universe be accomplished up to a sin-
gular scale transformation. In this case the causal structure would be
perfectly meaningful as a whole but the metric would not as it could not
be continued through the boundary. For more details on these extension
techniques see [20].
I conclude that it is possible to conceive a reasonable Universe whose
causal structure has features analogous to Taub-NUT (Misner) and that
then, after an initial phase, has the light cones tilted to match an ex-
panding FLRW Universe. Spacetimes presenting some of these elements
are for instance the λ-Taub-NUT spacetimes.
Similar models have already appeared in the literature. An important
article that anticipated some ideas considered in this work is [11]. How-
ever, while in that article the authors focused on the problem of quantum
field theory in spacetime with CTCs, here I shall consider mainly the
problems of homogeneity and entropy and their relation with causality.
In particular, I will introduce the idea of the rigidity at the boundary of
the chronology violating region (see next section). R. Penrose [28] has
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also advocated the possibility that the Big Bang could be only a layer
separating our observed Universe from a previous stage. An essential
difference with this proposal is the fact that he keeps a spacelike Big
Bang boundary, while as I shall explain, the null boundary allows us
to solve the homogeneity and entropy problems in a much more natural
way. Moreover, while he has to work with a cyclic cosmology in order to
satisfy the Weyl tensor hypothesis, we do not need such constraint since
we can justify Weyl tensor hypothesis using the null character of the Big
Bang.
Our past light cone
Last scattering
hypersurface
Region that admits
time functions
Boundary of chronology
violating set
(replaces Big Bang)
Distinction fails here
High homogeneity
Chronology violating
set
Expansion
(Scale factor)
Possibly conformally
singular matching
Possible inflationary
phase
p
Figure 1: A Universe with S1 section which gives an idea of the cos-
mological picture presented in this work. The region that admits time
functions is causally preceded by the chronology violating set (God) as
in Augustine’s conclusions.
4 The homogeneity and entropy problems
The cosmic microwave background (CMB) formed when, after a suffi-
cient expansion of the Universe, the density of matter decreased to a
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level that light decoupled from it (the mean free path of light became
infinite). The set of events of departure of those photons form an ideal
last scattering hypersurface. Today we observe just a portion of that hy-
persurface, namely the intersection of it with our past light cone. Since
we observe that the CMB radiation has the same spectra (temperature)
independently of the direction of observation, there is the problem of jus-
tifying such isotropy on the night sky. In fact the regions that emitted
that radiation were so far apart that, according to the FLRW scenario,
they didnt have any past point in common. This is the isotropy or ho-
mogeneity problem depending on whether one refers to the isotropy of
temperature on the night sky or on the equivalent homogeneity of tem-
perature on the last scattering hypersurface.
It is often claimed that inflation solves this problem. The idea is that
if a patch of space expands so much, in the initial phase of the Universe,
to include the whole surface we see today, then it should be natural
to observe homogeneity. This argument works only if homogeneity is
assumed at a different scale, actually at a much smaller scale, prior to
inflation, namely if the initial patch is considered homogeneous.
Indeed, if we look closer and closer at, say, a crystal of salt, al-
though apparently homogeneous it will show atomic inhomogeneities
when zoomed sufficiently, that is, expansion produces homogeneity only
if homogeneity is already present at a much smaller scale.
This criticism has been moved to inflation by several authors, as
rather than solving the problem of homogeneity, inflation seems to replace
a type homogeneity assumption with another [3, 9, 4, 27]. R. Penrose
argues that inflation may well prove to be correct but not for the initial
arguments moved in its favor [27].
Instead, the assumption that there is a chronology violating region
generating the whole Universe explains rather easily the homogeneity
of the CMB radiation. Indeed, the explanation has nothing to do with
the expansion of the Universe (namely to the conformal scale factor)
but rather to its causal structure. In our model any point p in the
last scattering hypersurface contains, in its own past, the chronology
violating region [r], namely [r] ⊂ I−(p) and in fact its boundary. Thus
the chronological pasts of the points in the last scattering hypersurface
share many points on spacetime, and thus it is reasonable that they have
similar temperatures.
Let us now make a few comments that will be useful in the discussion
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of the entropy problem. We have justified the isotropy of the CMB ra-
diation showing that the points in the last scattering hypersurface have
chronological pasts which share the boundary of the chronology violat-
ing region (the new proposal for Big Bang). Instead, in the inflationary
picture it was assumed that the homogeneous temperature at the last
scattering hypersurface was attained through a process called thermal-
ization according to which causally disconnected regions at the Big Bang
came into contact reaching a common temperature before decoupling
between matter and radiation (last scattering hypersurface). R. Penrose
[26, 27] has pointed out that the thermalization mechanism cannot be
considered a satisfactory explanation for homogeneity as it conflicts with
the so called entropy problem to which we shall return in a moment.
Our solution to the isotropy problem of the CMB radiation does not
require thermalization because the almost constant temperature on the
last scattering hypersurface comes from the fact that these points share
most of their chronological past independent of whether the events on
their past have the same temperature. Moreover, it seems likely that,
according to our proposal of causal structure, the universe would be al-
ready at a very homogeneous state at the boundary of the chronology vi-
olating region (Big Bang). Indeed, some mathematical results, connected
with the concept of compactly generated Cauchy horizon and imprisoned
curves [17, 22], suggest that this boundary must be generated by light-
like geodesics whose closure is exactly the boundary (as it happens in
figure 1). A well known open conjecture states that the compact Cauchy
horizons under positivity of energy (e.g., null energy condition) are differ-
entiable, where the generators do not escape the boundary neither in the
future nor in the past direction. The existence of the generators implies
that these horizons admit global vector fields, a fact that constrains their
topology (for instance, in 2+1 dimension it must be a torus while in 3+1
dimensions there are more possibilities). These results are also expected
to hold for the compact boundaries of chronology violating sets since
their mathematical properties are similar to those of Cauchy horizons.
Given any two points on the boundary p, q one would have q ∈ I+(p)
and p ∈ I+(q), thus in practice they could be considered as causally re-
lated. As they can communicate through the boundary, this boundary is
expected to attain an homogeneous temperature prior to any subsequent
expansion. Since the development of Quantum Field Theory under CTC
is at a early state of development, this claim is only a speculation. The
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analogy is that of a quantum field over a torus where the closed geodesic
generators of the torus are replaced by the generators of the Cauchy
horizon. The boundary conditions allow us to expand it in the Fourier
modes, and the most relevant one is that of lower excitation for which
the field is constant, namely homogeneous.
Of course this mechanism may be followed by that of inflation, but
we point out that it does not seem to be necessary. Indeed, the main
accomplishment of inflation seems to be its ability to predict the correct
density inhomogeneities over the homogeneous background. Hollands
and Wald [14] have recently argued not only that inflation does not sat-
isfactorily solve the homogeneity problem but also that the desired scale
free spectra of the perturbations can be obtained even in the absence of
inflation. They therefore claim that the main problem is that of homo-
geneity/isotropy as they could not find any dynamical mechanism for it.
We argued that such a mechanism exists, the solution lies in assuming
the existence of a chronology violating region from which the Universe
develops: a God in our terminology.
4.1 The entropy problem and the rigidity of achronal
hypersurfaces
Let us come to the entropy problem. This difficulty of standard cosmol-
ogy arises when considering the huge difference between the entropy of
the Universe today with that at the time of the Big Bang. R. Penrose by
taking into account also the gravitational entropy, has argued that the
Universe at its beginning had probably to be thermalized, to account for
the homogeneity problem, but nevertheless it had to be special as the
calculation of the entropy shows that it was much smaller than today.
Penrose concludes that the gravitational degrees of freedom had to
be in a very special state. In his view the Universe could increase in
entropy despite its initial thermalization because in the beginning the
gravitational degrees of freedom were almost frozen.
By the way, Penrose reaches this conclusion clarifying a common mis-
conception that attributes the initial small entropy of the Universe to its
size. Penrose shows that this position is untenable by considering poten-
tially recontracting universes.
He also notes that when matter is left to the action of gravity it tends
to clump, passing from an homogeneous state to an inhomogeneous one.
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The Weyl tensor increases because of this clumping, and therefore this
tensor may quantify in some sense the amount of entropy contained in
the gravitational degrees of freedoms. Thus Penrose ends suggesting that
in the beginning of the universe the Weyl tensor had to be very small,
and possibly zero. This is Penrose’s Weyl tensor hypothesis [26, 10].
We note that the important point is not that the Weyl tensor be zero
but rather that its components be fixed as this seems to be enough to
guarantee that the gravitational degrees of freedom were initially frozen.
In order to avoid misunderstandings we stress that the isotropy of the
CMB radiation does not provide evidence for a vanishing Weyl tensor
since decoupling, since this homogeneity is observed at a large cosmolog-
ical scale and hence holds only for the averaged metric. The real Weyl
tensor is non-zero at a local scale due to clumping, and its cumulated
effects over a space section is non-vanishing. The Penroses Weyl tensor
hypothesis states that this local cumulated contribution is zero at the Big
Bang while it is far from zero at the present epoch and at decoupling.
The picture of the beginning of the Universe presented in this work is
likely to satisfy the Penrose’s Weyl tensor hypothesis. Indeed, as I men-
tioned, the boundary of the chronology violating region would be gener-
ated by lightlike geodesics (which are moreover achronal). Now, there is
a rigidity result [1] which states that an asymptotically simple vacuum
spacetimes is isometric to Minkwoski spacetime in a neighborhood of ev-
ery achronal lightlike geodesic (Galloway’s null splitting theorem [7]). I
expect that analogous results should hold for the case considered in this
work, that is, I expect the spacetime near the boundary of the chronol-
ogy violating region to be isometric to some highly symmetric spacetime.
This rigidity would clearly fix the Weyl tensor and thus send to zero the
degrees of freedom contained in it.
In order to grasp why an achronal boundary generated by lightlike
geodesics is able to fix the geometry by constraining the Weyl tensor,
consider the equations for the expansion θ (measuring the divergence of
the transverse section to the flow) and for the shear σmn (measuring the
deformation) of the geodesics running on such hypersurface [13, Sect.
15
4.2]
dθ
dv
= −RabK
aKb − 2σ2 −
1
2
θ2,
dσmn
dv
= −Cm4n4 − θσmn − σmpσpn + δmnσ
2. (sum over p)
where m,n = 1, 2, Ka is the tangent vector to the null congruence, Rab
is the Ricci tensor, Cabcd is the Weyl tensor, v is the affine parameter
and a base adapted to the congruence has been chosen. Under future
null completeness the first equation implies the presence of a focusing
point if RabK
aKb + 2σ2 > 0 at some point of the null hypersurface.
However, the presence of a focusing point would contradict achronality
thus σmn = 0 everywhere and from the second equation one gets that
Cm4n4 = 0 all over the null hypersurface, a fact which may be regarded as
a partial confirmation of Penrose’s Weyl tensor hypothesis. Actually one
can dispense with the assumption of future null geodesic completeness
on the null hypersurface provided this hypersurface is compact. The idea
is that if it would not hold then by adapting Prop. 6.4.4 of [13] to the
almost closed case one could infer the presence of a closed timelike curve
in the future of the null hypersurface contradicting the assumption that
this hypersurface bounds the only chronology violating class.
In short we have given an argument that supports the Weyl tensor
conjecture and a solution to the entropy problem compatible with the
arguments originally proposed by Penrose.
Clearly, a full proof will require further study since it necessary to
show that the degrees of freedom of the Weyl tensor transverse to the
Big Bang null hypersurface vanish. Still the mechanism proposed in this
work is particularly effective in sending some components to zero, a fact
that might indeed point to the validity of our physical assumption: that
the Big Bang hypersurface is lightlike rather than spacelike.
We end by observing that the null genericity condition would not hold
for geodesics lying on the boundary of the chronology violating region.
Fortunately we do not need it in theorem 3.4, hence its consequences are
consistent with the rigidity of the boundary.
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5 Conclusions
In this work I presented a picture for the beginning of the Universe
which seems to be able to solve the isotropy and entropy problems. In
essence the Big Bang has to be replaced with a null hypersurface such
that all the points on it have the same chronological future (i.e. future
distinction is violated). As a consequence, the points in the last scattering
(spacelike) hypersurface have chronological pasts that contain one and
hence all points of this null hypersurface, a fact that clarifies the observed
temperature homogeneity.
While the solution of the isotropy problem is rather straightforward
under this assumption, the solution to the entropy problem relies on
some conjectures and speculations. In part, this is unavoidable since we
follow Penroses idea, which relates the entropy of the universe with the
Weyl tensor. The existence of such relation is itself a strong speculation
though supported by physical arguments. Using this idea, and assuming
that compact Cauchy horizons are differentiable, we were able to infer
the result that the Big Bang, interpreted as a past Cauchy horizon, is
generated by inextendible lightlike geodesics and hence that some compo-
nents of the Weyl tensor vanish there, thus supporting Penroses strategy
of solution to the entropy problem.
If proved necessary, the just mentioned beginning of the Universe
may be followed by a period of inflation, so that it is indeed possible
to join the good accomplishments of inflation with the solution of the
homogeneity and entropy problems given by the above idea.
By a stability argument, the spacetime once continued through the
null hypersurface must develop closed timelike curves. Indeed, a space-
time in which the cones tilt in the opposite sense would have a null
hypersurface (and hence a failure of distinction) that disappears under a
small perturbation of the metric (see figure 2 or figure 37 of [13]).
With the aim of solving the homogeneity and entropy problem one is
therefore naturally led to the idea of a chronology violating region from
which the whole Universe has developed [11].
I showed that this picture for a Universe fits well with some conclu-
sions reached by Augustine while he was answering some questions raised
by the Manichæans. To appreciate the correspondence it is necessary to
identify God with the chronology violating set that precedes the whole
Universe.
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(A) (B)
Figure 2: The presence of the closed null hypersurface in place of the
spacelike Big Bang hypersurface allows us to give a causality solution to
the entropy and homogeneity problems of cosmology. A stability argu-
ment shows that below the null hypersurface there must be a chronology
violating region. Indeed, in case (A) by a small perturbation of the met-
ric near its boundary the null hypersurface moves up or down but does
not disappear, hence the argument holds true even after a small pertur-
bation. Instead, in case (B) in which there is no chronology violation,
a small tilting of the light cones in the forward direction near the hy-
persurface destroys the null hypersurface. It must be noted that it is
meaningless to make (quantum) perturbation theory near the boundary,
because any perturbation pass to a perturbation of the metric and thus
moves the boundary itself.
I must say that I was developing the physical content of this work
before discovering Augustine thought in the Confessions. Nevertheless,
I was so puzzled by the correspondence that decided to present them
in conjunction so as to stress the similarities. While doing so I discov-
ered some unexpected results like theorem 3.4 which I missed in previous
analysis of similar problems, a fact which to my mind made the corre-
spondence even more interesting.
One may ask how it happened that Augustine went so close to the
model of Universe presented in these pages, given that he certainly ig-
nored general relativity. My own opinion is that while one is thinking
about a subject there are many ways of coming to trivial or incorrect
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conclusions, whereas only a few paths can lead to correct or at least
interestingly structured thoughts. It is therefore not an accident that
Augustine deep reflections on time, creation and God can find today a
correspondence in general relativity. It should suffice to consider that
the latter is the most advanced theory we have ever had on the dynamics
of time.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.4.
Recall that a future lightlike ray is a future inextendible achronal causal
curve, in particular it is a lightlike geodesic. Past lightlike rays are defined
analogously. A lightlike line is an achronal inextendible causal curve. In
particular a lightlike line is a lightlike geodesic without conjugate points.
The boundary of a set is denoted with a dot.
For the proof of the next lemma see [16, Prop. 2], or the proof of [23,
Theorem 12].
Lemma 5.1. Let [r] be a chronology violating class. If p ∈ ˙[r] then
through p passes a future lightlike ray contained in ˙[r] or a past lightlike
ray contained in ˙[r] (and possibly both).
Lemma 5.2. Let [r] be a chronology violating class such that I+([r]) =
M then ˙[r], is generated by future lightlike rays contained in ˙[r] and
J−([r] ) = [r].
Proof. Let p ∈ ˙[r] then since p ∈ M = I+([r]) it cannot be p ∈ I−([r])
otherwise p ≪ r ≪ p, i.e. p ∈ [r], a contradiction. As p ∈ ˙[r]\I−([r]),
there is a sequence pn ∈ [r], pn → p. Since pn ∈ [r] there are timelike
curves σn entirely contained in [r] which connect pn to r. By the limit
curve theorem [21] there is either (a) a limit continuous causal curve
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connecting p to r, in which case as [r] is open, p ∈ I−([r]), a contradiction,
or (b) a limit future inextendible continuous causal curve σ starting from
p and contained in [r]. Actually σ is contained in ˙[r] otherwise p ∈ I−([r]),
a contradiction. Moreover, σ is a future lightlike ray, otherwise there
would be q ∈ ˙[r]∩σ, p≪ q and as I+ is open p ∈ I−([r]), a contradiction.
For the last equality, assume by contradiction, q ∈ J−([r])\[r]. Since
q ∈M = I+(r) there is a timelike curve joining r to q and a causal curve
joining q to [r]. By making a small variation starting near q we get a
timelike curve from r to [r], and hence equivalently, from r to r passing
arbitrarily close to q, thus q ∈ [r], a contradiction. 
Here I give the proof of theorem 3.4. It is a non-trivial generalization
over the main theorem contained in [23].
Proof. Consider the spacetime N = M\[r] with the induced metric, and
denote by J+N its causal relation. This spacetime is clearly chronologi-
cal and in fact strongly causal. Indeed, if strong causality would fail at
p ∈ N then there would be sequences pn, qn → p, and causal curves σn
of endpoints pn, qn, entirely contained in N , but all escaping and reen-
tering some neighborhood of p. By an application of the limit curve
theorem [21, 1] on the spacetime M there would be an inextendible con-
tinuous causal curve σ passing through p and contained in N¯ to which a
reparametrized subsequence σn converges uniformly on compact subsets
(σ can possibly be closed). The curve σ must be achronal otherwise one
would easily construct a closed timelike curve intersecting N (a piece of
this curve would be a segment of some σn thus intersecting N). Thus
σ is a lightlike line. If the line is entirely contained in N then it is
inextendible in the spacetime (N, gN) and being complete by assump-
tion, since null genericity and null convergence hold, there would be two
conjugate points, a fact which contradicts the achronality of σ.
The possibility that σ intersects N˙ = ˙[r] leads also to a contradiction
because σ cannot intersect ˙[r] in the causal future of p as J−([r] ) = [r].
But if it intersects ˙[r] in the causal past of p, σ cannot be tangent to the
generators of ˙[r] otherwise by Lemma 5.2 p ∈ ˙[r], a contradiction, thus
after the intersection with ˙[r] (again by Lemma 5.2) σ remains in ˙[r]. This
fact implies that σ is not achronal, as it has a corner, a contradiction.
We conclude that strong causality holds on N .
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The next step is to prove that J+N is transitive. In this case N would
be causally easy [24] and hence stably causal (thus admitting time func-
tions). The transitivity of J+N is proved as done in [23, Theorem 5],
the only difference is that the argument allows us only to prove that if,
x, y, z ∈ N , (x, y) ∈ J+N and (y, z) ∈ J
+
N then (y, z) ∈ J
+(= I+) as the
limit causal curve passing through y may intersect N˙ . However, there are
neighborhoods U and V such that any timelike curve connecting U ∋ x,
U ⊂ N to V ∋ z, V ⊂ N must stay in N , because otherwise there would
be some w ∈ [r] such that x′ ≤ w, with x′ ∈ U . This is impossible
because by proposition 5.2, J−([r] ) ⊂ [r]. 
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